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Summary 
We determine the costs and benefits of being a capital or central municipality, where central costs are 
understood to be incurred specifically as a result of the problems large municipalities located at the 
centre of an urban agglomeration face (including costs associated with social issues, immigration, com­
muting and diseconomies of scale) and capital costs result from the presence of regional and/or central 
government institutions in the municipality (loss of revenue or increase in expenditure because of ac­
tivity substitution). However, these two qualities might also be beneficial to municipalities (resulting 
in a direct increase in their revenue or fiscal capacity). By estimating an equation of the expenditure 
needs and the fiscal capacity of Spanish municipalities with more than 75,000 inhabitants, we find that 
the central costs incurred by large municipalities are offset by their greater fiscal capacity, but that the 
same is not true for municipalities that serve as political/administrative capitals. 
Keywords: Local financing, large municipalities, central and capital costs and benefits, expenditure 
needs, fiscal capacity. 
JEL Classification: H72, H77, R51. 
1.  Introduction 
Local public finances are currently under considerable stress and the financial crisis 
serves only to highlight the need to rethink both expenditure and revenue policies at all lev­
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els of government. The situation is particularly critical among Spanish municipalities, which 
as the level of government closest to the citizens (voters) are responsible for delivering the 
most highly demanded public services, at a time when the Spanish financing system is fail­
ing to provide these authorities with adequate revenue tools to meet such demands 1. The out-
look is even worse for large municipalities, which are beset by a series of specific problems 
that have a direct impact on their local budget, but which are not contemplated by the local 
financing system. In the light of this current situation, the aim of this article is to estimate 
the impact on the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of being a large capital or central 
municipality. 
In terms of costs, the expenditure needs of large municipalities differ from those of other 
municipalities as their specific socioeconomic characteristics generate both central 
(spillover effects, concentration of social problems and/or congestion costs) and capital 
costs 2 (including, the substitution of productive activities with less productive administra­
tive activities or the loss of fiscal revenue because of the tax exemption of administrative ac­
tivities). 
Outside Spain, Washington D.C. is a good illustration of a city whose central and capi­
tal costs have not been solved by granting it a special financing system, but rather by increas­
ing the percentage of financing of some of the federal transfer programmes and requiring the 
federal government to accept the provision of certain services (prisons and civil service pen­
sions). A further illustration is provided by the case of the United Kingdom, where a system 
of unconditional transfers to municipalities, based on sophisticated methods of calculation, 
seeks to take into account certain factors related to central costs (McLean and McMillan, 
2003; Midwinter, 2002). 
In terms of revenue, the capital and/or central nature of a municipality may affect the de­
cisions of individuals and firms when choosing where to locate in the territory and, there­
fore, have an impact on the size of the tax base for each municipality (fiscal capacity). Ac­
cording to Ladd and Bradbury (1988), the fiscal capacity of a sub-central government 
depends on the decisions adopted by individuals and enterprises, which in turn depend on 
the perceived costs and benefits from the localisation in the territory of this sub-central gov­
ernment. 
The main contribution of this paper is to analyse the factors that affect large municipal­
ities’ expenditure needs and to determine whether these same factors also have a positive im­
pact on their fiscal capacity. Specifically, we analyse the impact of being a capital or central 
municipality, factors which have not received much attention in the academic literature. 
However, Greene et al. (1974), Ladd and Yinger (1989), Chernick and Tkacheva (2002) do 
analyse whether commuter costs are offset by the revenues commuters generate, concluding 
that commuter costs (reflecting centrality) tend to be higher than any additional revenues. 
This paper provides further empirical evidence on this question, analysing from a wider per­
spective than that taken by these earlier studies (that is, by taking into account other factors 
in addition to commuting) whether the various costs borne by large municipalities are offset 
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by the revenue generated by the economic activity, for instance, that the large municipalities 
can attract. To do so we draw on a dataset for Spanish municipalities with more than 
75,000 inhabitants 3, and estimate the determinants of both expenditure needs (Bosch and 
Solé-Ollé, 2005) and fiscal capacity. Note that, given that we focus on a certain type of mu­
nicipalities (those with more than 75,000 inhabitants), we are studying the differential effects 
of some capital/central factors among those large municipalities; we do not analyse the im­
pact of such factors with respect small size municipalities. This point is important to inter­
pret and understand properly the results we obtain. 
The present study comprises six sections, the first being this introduction. Section 2 de­
scribes the specific traits of large municipalities, in terms of their costs and revenues. Sec­
tion 3 reports the empirical analysis and Section 4 describes the data used in the estimation 
of the equations of the expenditure needs and the fiscal capacity of large municipalities. Sec­
tion 5 describes the main results obtained. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2.  The specific characteristics of large municipalities 
2.1. Cost factors: central and capital costs 
2.1.1. Central costs 
Central costs are those generated by the specific problems faced by large municipalities 
situated at the centre of an urban agglomeration. The main central cost is attributable to the 
flow of non-residents (those residing at a certain distance from the municipality in question) 
and which central cities absorb each day. Here, the main cost is caused by the spillover ef­
fect that municipal services are put under. Other central costs are attributable to the concen­
tration of social problems (immigration, poverty, etc.) and those related to diseconomies of 
scale, density or congestion. Each of these costs is briefly described below. 
Spillover effects and congestion costs of municipal services 
A central municipality typically receives a large flow of non-residents: for reasons of work 
(commuters), education, shopping, administrative activities and leisure. These non-resident 
visitors use the services provided by the municipality for its inhabitants (and tax payers). The 
main costs for the municipality generated by non-residents can be identified as traffic manage­
ment, cleaning, urban waste management, the maintenance of parks and public spaces as well 
as the provision of cultural and sports facilities and citizen safety and security. These services 
are provided by municipalities and (also) benefit non-residents that generally do not pay for 
them and, hence, they generate spillover (or external) effects and congestion costs. 
For the Spanish case, the literature here is not very extensive and comprises basically the 
studies undertaken by Solé-Ollé (2001, 2006) and Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) examining the 
70 NÚRIA BOSCH, MARTA ESPASA AND DANIEL MONTOLIO 
impact on the cost of the provision of municipal services of daily visitors who come to the 
central city for reasons of work and study. More specifically, Solé-Ollé (2001) quantifies the 
effects of a range of variables on the cost of providing municipal services in the municipal­
ities of the Barcelona province with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1996, concluding that 
commuters have an impact on expenditure on citizen safety and security, culture and sports, 
housing and urban development and public welfare. Solé-Ollé (2001) excludes, for reasons 
of comparability with the rest of the municipalities, the City of Barcelona; however, this in­
convenience is solved in Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) and Solé-Ollé (2006) which draw on a 
sample of more than 3,000 Spanish municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants in the 
year 1999. In these studies the impact of non-residents on municipal public services is meas­
ured using the size of the population (i.e., potential non-resident users of the central city’s 
public services) residing in locations within a 30-kilometre radius of the main central city. 
Solé-Ollé (2006) reports that a non-resident generates an average increase of 9.4% in the mu­
nicipal expenditure generated by a resident, a figure that rises to 24% in the case of residents 
in municipalities located in large urban areas. 
Attractivity cost 
Another type of non-resident with quite specific characteristics is the tourist. Here the 
costs will be either direct (promotion paid for by the city council) or indirect (greater inten­
sity of use of public services such as transport, cleaning, cultural activity and security). 
Cost of the concentration of social problems 
Central cities typically attract social problems associated with immigration, unemploy­
ment, poverty (the medium-high income population having abandoned the core areas) and 
delinquency. Solé-Ollé (2001) reports, for example, that rising poverty levels increase the 
cost of citizen safety and security, social services, culture and sports, and housing and urban 
development. Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) further report that immigrant population is poten­
tially related with poverty and with a positive and statistically significant impact on munic­
ipal expenditure. 
Other cost factors 
The level of population has an impact on public service unit costs, either reducing 
(economies of scale) or raising them (costs of congestion). The costs of congestion can be 
related to the effects of commuting, as we have described above, and also to population den­
sity, which is normally higher in large municipalities. A high population density can, for ex­
ample, increase the costs related to traffic, delinquency and the destruction of urban furni­
ture. Likewise, in some cases, a low population density can also generate higher costs in the 
provision of public services, including refuse collection, public lighting or security (costs re­
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lated to disperse populations). For a detailed discussion of urban agglomerations seen from 
the perspective of public finance see Cadaval (2004). 
2.1.2. Capital costs 
Capital costs are related to the presence in the municipality of State and Autonomous 
Community government institutions. The main costs in this case can be grouped into two 
categories: i) loss of income due to activity substitution, and ii) an increase in expenditure 
due to activity substitution. Each of these factors is described briefly below. 
Loss of income due to activity substitution 
A municipality that serves as a political capital specialises in activities of an administra­
tive nature and as a result the resources of the municipality (some of which are scarce, such 
as land) are used for administrative activities as opposed to other economic (primarily com­
merce and services) or residential activities. Activity substitution is not a neutral factor for 
the municipal treasury when the administrative activities of the Autonomous Communities 
and the State are exempt from payment of municipal taxes. So, for example, if a municipal­
ity contains the headquarters of government institutions it no longer receives the property tax 
corresponding to residences and/or businesses that hypothetically could occupy the area used 
for administrative purposes 4. This argument can be extended to other taxes in the municipal 
domain, for example the Motor Vehicle Tax and some fees and public prices. Moreover, ac­
tivity substitution with the increase of civil servants may lead to a lower average productiv­
ity in the municipality and, hence, weaken its fiscal bases. 
Increase in expenditure due to activity substitution 
It might also be the case that the substitution of residential, commercial and service ac­
tivities with administrative activities generates an increase in municipal expenditure, for in­
stance, in activities concerned with security and public safety (public events), in urban de­
velopment and the maintenance of public spaces (parks and gardens) and the improvement 
and promotion of the image of the capital. These impacts are difficult to quantify although 
Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2005) propose a methodology that uses public sector employees (au­
tonomous and central governments) per inhabitant as an approximation of municipal expen­
diture needs. 
2.2.  Revenue factors: benefits from being a capital/central municipality 
The centrality or capital status of a large municipality can also potentially generate ad­
ditional revenue. For instance, economies of agglomeration and infrastructures of communi­
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cation can attract the localisation of individuals and firms to large municipalities, and so 
have a positive effect on their fiscal capacity (Ladd and Bradbury, 1988). In this sense, 
Brueckner et al. (1999) report in a theoretical analysis conducted in Paris that individuals 
with higher levels of income tend to localise in zones with the best amenities (which in many 
cases are in, or close to, large urban areas). 
Therefore, we also analyse the effect that all the aforementioned factors might have on 
the fiscal capacity of large municipalities. For instance, it is not clear whether the benefits of 
the economic activity generated by visitors (commuters or tourists) offset their costs (given 
the limited revenue instruments available to the municipalities). Empirical evidence from the 
United States seems to indicate that the costs derived from commuting are not recovered by 
such large cities as New York and Philadelphia (Chernik and Tkacheva, 2002). Greene et al. 
(1974) also evaluate the additional costs and revenues generated by non-residents for the US 
city of Washington. 
Tourist enclaves exhibit many characteristics that are highly attractive to visitors and 
which can affect the fiscal capacity of the municipality through, for instance, a higher de­
mand for housing. In such cases, real estate prices rise and, as a result, the value of the prop­
erty tax base also rises. While only a few studies have sought to analyse whether tourism de­
termines the tax base volume of a jurisdiction, Glaeser et al. (2001) are able to show that 
American cities with the highest amenity levels (variety of private services, adequate clima­
tology, etc.) have higher housing prices, which in turn means a higher value of the property 
tax base. Likewise, Hawkins and Murray (2004) show that the number of hotels per capita, 
as a proxy of the number of visitors for leisure purposes, has a markedly positive effect on 
the per capita bases of a city’s sales taxes. 
In some ways, the previously presented costs could be seen as potential revenue raisers. 
Apart from the obvious cases of commuting (work, studies, shopping, administrative activ­
ities and leisure) and tourism, which are easily identified as potential sources of revenue for 
recipient municipalities via a variety of channels, other variables, including immigration, 
unit costs (wages) or activity substitution, could have a positive impact on a municipality’s 
fiscal capacity. Indeed, all of them could attract more economic activity and, hence, increase 
directly and indirectly local revenues such as property tax or the tax on economic activities. 
Few studies to date have tested whether these factors also affect the fiscal capacity and, so, 
the analysis undertaken here also represents a new contribution to the testing of this relation­
ship. 
3.  Empirical analysis 
3.1. Estimation of an equation of expenditure needs 
The quantification of expenditure needs is based on econometric estimations of the av­
erage estimated impact of the cost variables (both, central and capital) on municipal expen­
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diture per inhabitant 5. In this way we can quantify the additional expenditure (measured with 
regard to the average) that these variables represent given the actual value that they take for 
each municipality under consideration (Solé-Ollé, 2001, 2006). In line with Bosch and Solé-
Ollé (2005), the determinants of municipal expenditure can be expressed as: 
ln(g/pop) = α + β1 ln(Z) + β2 ln(F) + β3 ln(X) + ε (1) 
where g/pop is the per capita expenditure (current or total) 6, Z is a vector of cost variables, 
F is a vector of fiscal variables that account for the resources available to the municipality, 
X is a vector of other variables that are taken into account and ε is the error term. 
3.2.  Estimation of an index of fiscal capacity 
Estimating the impact of different variables on the fiscal capacity of a municipality re­
quires that this index is first calculated. This is by no means straightforward as there is more 
than one way of calculating it, and there are various difficulties that must be overcome. 
An index of fiscal capacity must capture as closely as possible the fiscal capacity of the 
municipality. In order to do this various methods have been proposed to measure the poten­
tial revenues of a municipality: i) tax collection; ii) macroeconomic indicators, including mu­
nicipal GDP or municipal income; and iii) microeconomic indicators, including the Represen­
tative Tax System (RTS) 7. More specifically, the RTS draws on the available information for 
the tax base (B) of any type of municipal revenue and the standard tax rate (t). With this in­
formation, and using the RTS approach, the index of fiscal capacity can be constructed as: 
n 
B t  / Pop×∑ ij j i 
j=1fiscal capacityi = i = 1,..., N and j = 1,...,n (2)N n N ∑∑B t× / ∑Popij j i
 
i=1 j=1 i=1
 
where n is the number of different revenue sources considered and N is the total number of 
municipalities considered. Eq. (2) can also be expressed as: 
b 
fiscal capacityi = ∑n α j ij (3) 
j=1 bj 
where αj is the share (summing up to 1) of each type of revenue in a representative budget 
and b is the tax base expressed in per capita terms 8. Given the budgetary structure of rev­
enues for large municipalities, for our calculations we opt to use just the property tax and the 
tax on economic activity. In 2008 these local taxes represent 22.9% of current revenues and 
66.7% of tax revenues 9. 
In the case of the property tax (the main source of municipal revenue), there is a major 
shortcoming to our obtaining a true measure of the fiscal capacity. The measure of the tax 
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base is the cadastral value of the properties located in the municipality; however, the cadas­
tral values are not homogenously updated for all municipalities. In other words, local gov­
ernments can endogenously decide when to revise cadastral values and, hence, to increase 
(or otherwise) the tax base of the property tax 10. There are two ways in which we can over­
come this problem: by correcting the cadastral value or by implementing a correction via the 
tax rates. The first option is in practice particularly difficult to implement because we would 
require data on the evolution of the market prices of properties in all the municipalities and 
for all years or, alternatively, the evolution of data on housing prices (assuming that all prop­
erties evolve in a similar fashion to housing). 
The second option is the correction of the tax base via tax rates based on the assumption 
that nominal tax rates differ between municipalities according to the time elapsed since the 
last updating of cadastral values. More specifically, we expect lower tax rates in those mu­
nicipalities that have most recently revised their cadastral values 11. Indeed, in the appendix 
we provide evidence supporting this assumption 12. In practical terms, we use tax rate infor­
mation to modify the property tax base: to each municipality i, and depending if it has re­
vised cadastral values in 2001 or not, we apply the average tax rate of all those municipali­
ties that have revised their cadastral values in the same period of time (before or after 2001). 
In the case of the tax on economic activity, we use the municipal tax base (the so-called 
Cuotas mínimas), which is the estimated contents of each business, professional and artistic 
activity weighted by coefficients depending on the location and turnover of the activities 
present in the municipality. 
Therefore, we construct an index of fiscal capacity for large municipalities in Spain as 
presented in Eq. (3), with the shares (α) of the property tax and the tax on economic activi­
ty being equal to 84 and 16%, respectively. Once the measure has been constructed we can 
then estimate its possible determinants in the same way as for the expenditure needs present­
ed in Eq. (1). 
ln(fc)i = γ + ∂1 ln(F) + ∂2 ln(S) + u (4) 
where fc is the index of fiscal capacity of municipality i, F is a vector of fiscal variables, S 
is a vector of economic and socio-demographic variables (some of which may coincide with 
the expenditure needs equation) and u is the error term. 
3.3.  Simultaneous determination of needs and capacity 
Finally, an important point to take into account to properly interpret the results obtained 
for the estimation of both the expenditure needs and the fiscal capacity equations, is that it 
might also be the case that the fiscal capacity determines the expenditure needs of a munic­
ipality or vice versa: i.e. a municipality might make its spending decisions in line with the 
fiscal capacity of its tax bases or (productive) expenditure might have a positive impact on 
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the tax bases of the municipality and, hence, increase its fiscal capacity. Moreover, the afore­
mentioned endogeneity problem might also be seen as simultaneous decisions being taken 
regarding property tax rate and fiscal capacity (and spending). In order to address this issue 
we estimate a simultaneous equation model using 3-SLS as follows: 
ln(g/pop) = α + β1 ln(Z) + β2 ln(F) + β3 ln(X) + β4 ln(fc) + ε 
ln(fc) = γ + ∂1 ln(prop_tax_08) + ∂2 ln(g/pop) + ∂3 ln(F) + ∂4 ln (S) + u (5) 
ln(prop_tax_08) = σ + λ1 ln(prop_tax_07) + λ2 ln(fc) + λ3 ln(g/pop) + λ4 ln(F) + v 
In Eq. (5) municipal expenditure per inhabitant (g/pop), current and total, is both a de­
pendent variable and enters as an explanatory variable of the fiscal capacity. Similarly, fc is 
also introduced as a determinant of expenditures needs. Finally, fiscal capacity and the prop­
erty tax rate are also assumed to be decided simultaneously. 
4.  Data issues 
4.1. Variables and data used for the estimation of expenditure needs 
For the empirical estimation, all the municipalities that had over 75,000 inhabitants in 
2008 are available, except Granada 13; hence, we have information for 91 large municipali­
ties in Spain. However, for reasons of data availability, we perform some of the estimations 
for a subsample of 86 municipalities, that is, excluding the municipalities of the Basque 
Country and Navarra. Table 1 presents summary statistics of all the variables used in the em­
pirical estimations and which are described below. 
Dependent variable 
The econometric estimations take the current municipal expenditure per inhabitant 
(gc/pop) as a dependent variable, as well as the total non-financial municipal expenditure per 
inhabitant (gt/pop). All municipal budgetary data come from the Spanish Ministry of Fi­
nance and Public Administration. 
Explanatory variables 
Spillover effects, congestion and attractivity costs (central costs) 
We compute the population resident within a 30-km radius of the municipality to proxy 
the potential spillover effect on its public services resulting from the (daily) use of non-res­
ident visitors as well as the congestion costs derived from these potential commuters, as pre­
viously explained. The municipal population data are obtained from the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (INE in its Spanish acronym) for the year 2008 14. More specifically, the 
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variable constructed (potential_users) is a measure of the potential users (population within 
30-km radius) in relation to the population of the central city interacted with a dummy vari­
able that takes a value of 1 if the municipality is considered a central city and 0 if the mu­
nicipality is peripheral and close to a central city 15. By interacting potential users with this 
dummy variable means we only take into account those municipalities that have a power of 
attraction over their neighbouring municipalities. 
To estimate the attractiveness cost on municipal expenditure of the number of tourists 
we use a municipal tourist index (i_tourism) calculated from the data provided by the “Spain 
Economic Yearbook” edited by La Caixa savings bank. The index is expressed as a percent­
age of the Spanish total and in relation to the resident population in the municipality (also 
expressed as a percentage of the Spanish total). This variable seeks to capture the intensive 
use of the resources of central municipalities that attract a large tourist population (because 
of such services as museums, cultural activities, beaches, etc.). 
To approximate the congestion costs from commuters for consumption of private com­
mercial services we use the employ_serv variable that represents the number of employees 
in the municipality working in the service sector in relation to the municipality’s total pop­
ulation. This variable is created using data from the Institute of Economic Research of Va­
lencia (IVIE in its Spanish acronym) and approximates the intensive use of the service sec­
tor in central municipalities that can attract the neighbouring population for consumer 
activities. 
Table 1
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
gt/pop Total non-financial expenditure 
per inhabitant in 2008 91 1049.83 318.55 625.08 3124.58 
gc/pop Current expenditure per inhabitant 
in 2008 91 848.52 247.10 535.18 2473.45 
potential_users Population within 30km per inhabitant* 
Dummy = 1 if central municipality in 2008 91 1.09 1.47 0.00 6.78 
Touristic index (as a % of Spanish total 
i_tourism index)/population (as a % of Spanish 91 0.93 1.64 0.01 11.37 
total population) in 2007 
employ_serv Employees in the service sector/ 
population in 2008 91 0.74 0.09 0.48 0.91 
immg_non_eu Foreigners from outside the EU/ 
population in 2008 91 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.25 
unemp Unemployment rate in 2008 91 5.6 1.88 2.4 10.6 
w_cost Wage per worker paid in the local 
administration in 2006 (index Spain = 1) 91 2.44 2.23 0.19 10.65 
employ_public Employees of the central and autonomous 
administration in 2006 / population 91 0.023 0.021 0.003 0.108 
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Table 1 (Continued)
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
urban_area/pop Urban area (km
2) in relation to the 
population in 2008 86 0.014 0.011 0.002 0.073 
pop_under_16 Population under 16 years of age/ 
population in 2008 91 0.16 0.03 0.11 0.23 
pop_over_65 Population over 65 years of age/ 
population in 2008 91 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.22 
pop_20_64 Population over 19 and under 65 years 
of age/population in 2008 91 0.65 0.02 0.61 0.73 
pop_illiterate Illiterate + population without schooling/ 
population in 2001 91 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.27 
pop_higher_educ Population with higher education/ 
population in 2001 91 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.46 
current_transf/pop Revenue from current transfers per 
inhabitant in 2008 91 5.70 0.39 4.42 6.94 
capital_transf/pop Revenue from capital transfers per 
inhabitant in 2008 91 3.38 1.01 0.59 5.30 
own_taxes/pop Revenue from own taxes per inhabitant 
in 2008 91 5.81 0.28 4.59 6.67 
fc Fiscal capacity index (index Spain = 1) 
in 2008 85 1.00 0.45 0.39 2.81 
property_tax_08 Property tax rate in 2008 85 0.68 0.18 0.38 1.17 
property_tax_07 Property tax rate in 2007 85 0.68 0.17 0.42 1.17 
Concentration of social problems (central costs) 
The number of immigrants allows us to capture the influence of social factors on munic­
ipal expenditure. The data are obtained from the official register of residents published by 
the INE. Specifically, we use the percentage of foreign nationals from outside the EU in re­
lation to the total population of the municipality (immg_non_eu). To account for other social 
factors we use the municipal unemployment rate in 2008 (unemp), which should also cap­
ture the level of economic activity in the municipality, and the illiterate population and the 
population without schooling in relation to the total population of the municipality (pop_il­
literate). 
Costs of the factors (capital costs) 
The variation in public sector salary costs between municipalities is introduced as a cap­
ital cost. This variable, w_cost 16, is calculated as the total amount of wages in relation to the 
total number of workers in the local administration of the municipality 17. Another variable, 
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which likewise approximates the capital costs that a municipality incurs, is the number of 
workers employed in the central and autonomous administration (employ_public) that are 
present in the municipality. This variable is obtained by subtracting the number of workers 
in the local public administration (available from the official figures published by the Span­
ish Ministry of Public Administration – the Statistical Bulletin of Personnel Serving in the 
Public Administration) from the total number of workers in the municipality employed in the 
“public administration, defence and obligatory social security” (employment data taken from 
the two digit National Classification of Economic Activities published by IVIE). As with the 
other employment variables, they are calculated for the year 2006 18. 
Other expenditure needs (control variables) 
In addition to the above variables that capture the features of the municipalities’ capital 
and central statuses, we use other potential determinants of their expenditure needs as con­
trol variables. The urban area in relation to the population in 2008 (urban_area/pop) is taken 
into account to capture the effect of density on the cost of providing municipal services (for 
instance, refuse collection services). This variable is constructed with the area of buildings 
and building lots in each municipality (in square meters) in relation to its total population 
(data taken from the Cadastral Register). 
Other variables included are those that refer to the characteristics of the municipal pop­
ulation that might have an impact on public expenditure: specifically, the population under 
16 years of age in relation to the total population of the municipality (pop_under_16) 19 and 
the population over 65 years of age in relation to the total population of the municipality 
(pop_over_65). These variables, calculated for the year 2008, measure the impact of the 
presence in the municipality of two groups of individuals who are likely to be the main re­
ceivers of municipal public services. Another control variable is the population with higher 
education in relation to the total population of the municipality (pop_higher_educ). In this 
case, people with higher education seem to tend to return to central municipalities, with the 
consequence of increases in the housing prices, and also higher demand for cultural servic­
es and leisure amenities from the municipality. In this way we are able to control the level 
of municipal expenditure in relation to the characteristics of the resident population, as these 
variables capture resident needs in a particular municipality as regards one level of expendi­
ture or another. In this case, given that census data from the INE are required for their con­
struction, the variables refer to values for the year 2001. 
Availability of revenue 
The estimations of the equations for expenditure needs also require the use of variables 
associated with the revenues obtained by the municipality. The revenue from current trans­
fers in relation to the population of the municipality in 2008 (current_transf/pop) is used in 
the regressions to quantify the resources received by the municipality from other levels of 
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government 20. We assume that the municipalities that receive most transfers can spend 
more. Likewise, income from capital transfers in relation to the population of the municipal­
ity for 2008 (capital_transf/pop) as well as the revenue from their own taxes per capita 
(own_taxes/pop) are calculated. 
4.2.  Variables and data used for the estimation of fiscal capacity 
In general, the variables that might affect the fiscal capacity of a municipality are prima­
rily fiscal variables and economic and socio-demographic variables. Below, we provide a de­
tailed description of the variables included in the estimation of Eq. (4). 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the fiscal capacity index (fc) as described in detail in section 4.2 
and in the appendix. We use data from the Cadastral Register which includes detailed informa­
tion for all municipalities (except those in the Basque Country and Navarra). The urban land 
registry files include variables that accurately identify the municipality, province and Au­
tonomous Community to which the municipality belongs. They also include information for 
the year of the last cadastral revision, the number of urban units, the assessed value (in thou­
sands of euros), the number of property tax receipts and taxable income (in thousands of euros). 
Finally, the dataset includes the tax rate applied by each municipality and the tax deductions. 
Explanatory variables 
Fiscal variables 
In the short run, the main determinant of the fiscal capacity of a municipality is the tax 
rate on property, the main source of revenue for local governments with a fairly fixed tax 
base. Thus, as a determinant of fiscal capacity we include the property tax rate in the munic­
ipality in 2008 (property_tax_08). However, this rate is not exogenous to the fiscal capacity 
itself and, as a result, we might face problems of endogeneity. To overcome this problem we 
estimate the fiscal capacity equation using a 2-SLS procedure, using as instruments of the 
property tax rate in the municipality in 2008 the property tax rate in the previous year (prop­
erty_tax_07) and the other sources of revenue current_transf/pop, capital_transf/pop and 
own_taxes/pop 21. 
Economic and socio-demographic variables 
To analyse other possible determinants of the fiscal capacity of a given municipality, we 
adhere to a strategy founded on the fact that, a priori, many of the variables presented as 
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costs factors might also well have a positive impact on a municipality’s revenues. As dis­
cussed above, certain variables might also attract economic activity to the municipality, such 
as potential users (potential_users), tourists (i_tourism), a predominant presence of the serv­
ice sector (employ_serv), immigration (immg_non_eu), higher wages (w_cost) or the pres­
ence of public servants from other administrations (employ_public). 
Note that for some of the socio-demographic variables, we have no a priori expectations 
regarding their impact (if any) on the municipality’s fiscal capacity. This is the case for those 
variables that refer to the characteristics of the municipal population (pop_under_16 and 
pop_over_65) 22 and those that capture the educational level of the population (pop_illiter­
ate and pop_higher_educ). In the case of unemployment (unemp), we expect a negative sign 
with respect to the fiscal capacity index, whereas we expect a positive impact of the variable 
capturing the urban surface area in relation to the population in 2008 (urban_area/pop). 
5.  Main results 
The results of the estimation of the equation for expenditure needs are presented in Table 
2 for the sample of 91 municipalities (columns 1 and 2) and for the sample of 85 municipal­
ities with more than 75,000 inhabitants (columns 3 and 4). As discussed above, we do not 
have access to cadastral data for the municipalities of the Basque Country or those of Navar­
ra and, hence, we are unable to use variables such as the urban surface area in relation to the 
population as a determinant of expenditure needs. The estimations have been carried out 
using two definitions of the dependent variable: current expenditure per capita and total non­
financial expenditure per capita 23. 
Table 2
 
EXPENDITURE NEEDS IN MUNICIPALITIES WITH MORE THAN 

75,000 INHABITANTS IN SPAIN. OLS ESTIMATES
 
Variables 
Full sample 
Current needs Total needs 
No Basque Country and Navarra 
municipalities 
Current needs Total needs 
l_gc/pop l_gt/pop l_gc/pop l_gt/pop 
potential_users 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.012 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
l_i_tourism 0.039** 0.042** 0.038** 0.042** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
l_employ_serv 0.439** 0.433** 0.615*** 0.546*** 
(0.189) (0.179) (0.207) (0.196) 
l_immg_non_eu -0.006 0.025 0.026 0.045 
(0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.032) 
l_unemp -0.084 -0.113 -0.033 -0.081 
(0.100) (0.094) (0.106) (0.100) 
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Table 2 (Continued)
 
EXPENDITURE NEEDS IN MUNICIPALITIES WITH MORE THAN 

75,000 INHABITANTS IN SPAIN. OLS ESTIMATES
 
Variables 
Full sample No Basque Country and Navarramunicipalities
Current needs Total needs 
l_gc/pop l_gt/pop 
Current needs Total needs 
l_gc/pop l_gt/pop 
l_w_cost 
l_employ_public 
l_urban_area/pop 
l_pop_under_16 
l_pop_over_65 
l_pop_higher_educ 
l_pop_illiterate 
l_current_transf/pop 
l_capital_transf/pop 
l_own_taxes/pop 
l_fc 
Constant 
0.254*** 
(0.047) 
0.258*** 
(0.052) 
0.821*** 
(0.183) 
0.171* 
(0.095) 
–0.179** 
(0.085) 
–0.054 
(0.065) 
0.402*** 
(0.050) 
–0.008 
(0.017) 
0.111 
(0.086) 
6.043*** 
(0.831) 
0.300*** 
(0.045) 
0.286*** 
(0.049) 
(0.040) 
0.799*** 
(0.173) 
0.160* 
(0.090) 
–0.103 
(0.081) 
–0.058 
(0.061) 
0.407*** 
(0.048) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
–0.009 
(0.081) 
(0.058) 
7.037*** 
(0.788) 
0.296*** 
(0.050) 
0.291*** 
(0.055) 
0.010 
(0.038) 
0.752*** 
(0.196) 
0.168* 
(0.096) 
–0.143 
(0.087) 
0.001 
(0.075) 
0.284*** 
(0.071) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.098) 
0.040 
(0.055) 
7.727*** 
(0.985) 
0.321*** 
(0.047) 
0.292*** 
(0.052) 
–0.023 
0.791*** 
(0.186) 
0.158* 
(0.091) 
–0.066 
(0.083) 
–0.026 
(0.071) 
0.296*** 
(0.068) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
–0.132 
(0.093) 
0.096* 
8.563*** 
(0.934) 
Observations 
R-squared 
F 
91 
0.67 
10.82*** 
91 
0.73 
14.71*** 
85 
0.67 
8.73*** 
85 
0.74 
11.96*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. We obtain robust estimates eliminating 
Barcelona and Madrid from the sample and using an index of fiscal capacity, as explanatory variable, based only in 
the property tax. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that, in the case of factors related to central costs (i.e., 
spillover effects), the number of tourists and the number of employees in the service sector 
are positive, statistically significant determinants. Moreover, given that these variables are 
introduced in log format, they can be interpreted as elasticities. Hence, a one per cent in-
crease in the tourist index increases total non-financial expenditure per capita by 0.042%, 
while a one percent increase in the share of employees engaged in the service sector increas­
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es total non-financial expenditure per capita between 0.43 and 0.54%. By contrast, the po­
tential number of users of the municipality’s public services (measured in terms of the pop­
ulation resident within a 30 km radius of the central city in relation to the total population of 
the city interacted with a dummy variable indicating the municipality’s central status) is not 
statistically significant. The fact that this factor is not statistically significant is somehow ex­
pected given that, as previously pointed out, we do not analyze differential costs of large mu­
nicipalities in front of small municipalities. We study the effect of some factors across cen­
tral and capital municipalities, all of them above 75,000 inhabitants. Therefore, it seems that 
commuters are not a factor that differentiates the cost among those cities. Most probably, and 
as pointed out in Solé-Ollé (2001), commuters are a differential cost with respect small mu­
nicipalities, but we are not analyzing that effect. Similarly, immigration and unemployment 
variables do not seem to be significant determinants of expenditure needs either across large 
municipalities. 
As for the factors representing capital costs, the two variables tested were found to be 
positive and statistically significant factors with an estimated impact of around 0.30%. These 
results indicate that the number of workers employed by the central and autonomous admin­
istrations located in the municipality, in addition to the salaries paid to the employees of the 
local administration, have a positive impact on municipal expenditure. 
The results obtained for the variables capturing the municipalities’ expenditure needs, 
including the share of population under 16, are statistically significant and positive with a 
very high estimated elasticity (0.8%) 24. Similarly, the share of population over 65 is also 
positive, but this factor presents a lower level of significance and a lower point estimate 
(0.16%). Both variables reflecting the educational level of the population and the population 
density variable were found not to be statistically significant. In the case of the fiscal vari­
ables, the estimations conducted confirm that only revenue derived from current transfers 
has a positive impact on expenditure needs. Note that these results are fairly robust accord­
ing to the four models analysed (two dependent variables and two samples) and do not pres­
ent significant differences across the estimated models. 
The results of the estimation of the equation for fiscal capacity using instrumental vari­
ables are shown in Table 3. First, the Sargan test reported at the bottom of Table 3 deter­
mines the validity of the instruments used. Second, as expected, the property tax rate has a 
negative impact on the fiscal capacity index (equal, remember, to 0.84 and 0.16% of the tax 
bases of the property tax and the tax on economic activity, respectively). Third, in the case 
of the impact of the variables that account for the centrality costs of municipalities we find, 
in line with the expenditure needs estimation, that the variables capturing the number of po­
tential users and the level of immigration in the municipality are not statistically significant, 
whereas tourism and the number of employees in the service sector are positive and signifi­
cant determinants of the fiscal capacity index of the municipality. Moreover, unemployment 
is found to be significant and to present a negative sign; that is, the higher the level of un­
employment in the municipality, the lower is its fiscal capacity – a result that, in principle, 
makes economic sense. 
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Table 3
 
FISCAL CAPACITY IN MUNICIPALITIES WITH MORE THAN 75,000 INHABITANTS
 
IN SPAIN (EXCLUDING MUNICIPALITIES IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY AND
 
NAVARRA). INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES USING 2-SLS
 
Variables l_fc l_fc l_fc l_fc 
l_property_tax_08 –0.260* –0.269* –0.296** –0.363** 
(0.148) (0.143) (0.142) (0.144) 
potential_users 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.021 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
l_i_tourism 0.058* 0.059* 0.064** 0.096*** 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) 
l_employ_serv 0.658 0.704* 0.825** 0.429 
(0.418) (0.422) (0.394) (0.379) 
l_immg_non_eu –0.006 –0.003 0.014 –0.011 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.063) (0.065) 
l_unemp –0.296 –0.327* –0.317* –0.384** 
(0.199) (0.189) (0.189) (0.194) 
l_w_cost 0.123 0.116 0.171* 0.203** 
(0.121) (0.119) (0.098) (0.101) 
l_employ_public 0.046 0.043 0.091 0.106 
(0.128) (0.124) (0.109) (0.113) 
l_urban_area/pop 0.184** 0.172*** 0.168*** 
(0.078) (0.062) (0.062) 
l_pop_under_16 0.316 
(0.444) 
l_pop_over_65 0.304 
(0.198) 
l_pop_20_64 –1.347 –1.520 –1.869* 
(1.082) (1.066) (1.098) 
l_pop_higher_educ –0.019 –0.006 0.003 0.090 
(0.171) (0.163) (0.163) (0.166) 
l_pop_illiterate 0.100 0.127 0.155 0.209 
(0.138) (0.134) (0.129) (0.132) 
l_gt/pop 0.185 0.156 
(0.211) (0.195) 
Constant 0.194 –1.412 –0.078 –1.038 
(2.367) (2.008) (1.105) (1.085) 
Observations 85 85 85 85 
R-squared 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.40 
Sargan 29.03*** 29.04*** 27.67*** 31.08*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. We obtain robust estimates eliminating 
Barcelona and Madrid from the sample, using current expenditure per capita as explanatory variable instead of total 
expenditure per capita and using as a dependent variable an index of fiscal capacity based only in the property tax. 
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Fourth, an inspection of the variables that capture a municipality’s capital status shows 
that the results are not as significant as they are in the expenditure needs equation. Here, only 
the variable that approximates the salaries paid to employees in the local public sector is pos­
itive and slightly significant (0.17-0.20%). Fifth, as regards our findings for the other poten­
tial determinants of a municipality’s fiscal capacity (in the main, the socio-demographic 
variables), the most notable result is the positive and very significant impact of population 
density (which presumably captures the positive impact on the tax base of the property tax) 
and the fact that, in general, the variables capturing the age structure and the level of educa­
tion of the population do not have a significant effect on the fiscal capacity index. 
Finally, and given the (more than) likely simultaneity of expenditure needs, fiscal capac­
ity and property tax, we estimate the three equations simultaneously by means of 3-SLS (see, 
Eq. 5) to confirm, or not, the results obtained up to this juncture. The results, reported in 
Table 4, confirm our previous findings. Note that the results suggest a clear simultaneity be­
tween fiscal capacity and property tax rate, but this is by no means so clear when analysing 
needs and fiscal capacity. In the latter case, note that the fiscal capacity index is not a signif­
icant determinant of expenditure needs and, likewise, the current (or total non-financial) ex­
penditure per capita does not seem to affect the fiscal capacity index. Therefore, the results 
presented above can be considered valid, particularly given that the results for the fiscal ca­
pacity index (Table 4) were obtained by introducing the property tax rate as an explanatory 
variable and using 2-SLS to instrument the possible endogenous determination of tax rates 
and tax bases, especially in the case of the property tax. 
Table 4
 
JOINT DETERMINATION OF EXPENDITURE NEEDS, FISCAL CAPACITY
 
AND PROPERTY TAX RATE USING 3-SLS
 
Variables 
Current 
needs 
l_gc/pop 
Fiscal 
capacity 
l_fc 
Property 
tax rate 
l_prop_tax 
Total 
needs 
l_gt/pop 
Fiscal 
capacity 
l_fc 
Property 
tax rate 
l_prop_tax 
potential_users 0.007 0.022 0.014 0.029 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.011) (0.024) 
l_i_tourism 0.042** 0.047 0.044*** 0.063* 
(0.017) (0.037) (0.015) (0.038) 
l_employ_serv 0.795*** 1.059** 0.568*** 1.162** 
(0.195) (0.480) (0.180) (0.454) 
l_immg_non_eu 0.022 –0.019 0.045 –0.003 
(0.031) (0.062) (0.029) (0.067) 
l_unemp –0.101 –0.425** –0.101 –0.450** 
(0.097) (0.181) (0.090) (0.191) 
l_w_cost 0.332*** 0.220 0.320*** 0.306* 
(0.049) (0.158) (0.045) (0.164) 
l_employ_public 0.310*** 0.118 0.287*** 0.188 
(0.053) (0.163) (0.048) (0.163) 
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Table 4 (Continued)
 
JOINT DETERMINATION OF EXPENDITURE NEEDS, FISCAL CAPACITY
 
AND PROPERTY TAX RATE USING 3-SLS
 
Current Fiscal Property Total Fiscal Property 
Variables needs capacity tax rate needs capacity tax rate 
l_gc/pop l_fc l_prop_tax l_gt/pop l_fc l_prop_tax 
l_urban_area/pop 0.051 0.144** –0.028 0.105 
(0.044) (0.071) (0.041) (0.084) 
l_pop_under_16 0.812*** 0.722 0.807*** 0.980* 
(0.181) (0.478) (0.167) (0.524) 
l_pop_over_65 0.201** 0.291 0.156* 0.377* 
(0.091) (0.189) (0.083) (0.202) 
l_pop_higher_educ –0.161** –0.110 –0.065 –0.086 
(0.081) (0.160) (0.074) (0.163) 
l_pop_illiterate 0.021 0.158 –0.018 0.180 
(0.069) (0.132) (0.064) (0.135) 
l_current_transf/pop 0.302*** –0.064* 0.280*** –0.058* 
(0.072) (0.034) (0.066) (0.032) 
l_capital_transf/pop 0.009 –0.005 0.016 –0.008 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) 
l_own_taxes/pop 0.043 0.139 –0.184 0.117 
(0.130) (0.093) (0.120) (0.087) 
l_fc –0.158 –0.317*** 0.119 –0.268*** 
(0.134) (0.095) (0.123) (0.086) 
l_property_tax_08 –0.336** –0.411** 
(0.143) (0.168) 
l_gc/pop –0.081 0.229*** 
(0.427) (0.064) 
l_property_tax_07 0.834*** 0.880*** 
(0.061) (0.054) 
l_gt/pop –0.359 0.170*** 
(0.401) (0.053) 
Constant 7.699*** 2.410 –2.058*** 8.918*** 5.137 –1.577** 
(1.057) (4.129) (0.796) (0.974) (4.050) (0.699) 
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 
R–squared 0.61 0.42 0.90 0.74 0.39 0.91 
chi2_1 163.33*** 235.52*** 
chi2_2 66.80*** 64.59*** 
chi2_3 875.89*** 952.54*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. We obtain robust estimates eliminating 
Barcelona and Madrid from the sample and using as a dependent variable an index of fiscal capacity based only in 
the property tax. 
86 NÚRIA BOSCH, MARTA ESPASA AND DANIEL MONTOLIO 
In short, the results in Table 4 show that the centrality variables of tourism and employ­
ment in the service sector affect both expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. At the same 
time, the number of potential users and immigration are not significant factors, although the 
unemployment rate does have a negative impact on the fiscal capacity of municipalities. The 
capital status variables seem to have a greater impact on expenditure needs than they do on 
fiscal capacity, a finding that is similar for the socio–demographic variables which, as ex­
pected, seem to have a greater effect on expenditure needs. 
6.  Conclusions 
This study has determined the costs and benefits for Spain’s large municipalities (de­
fined as those with a population over 75,000 inhabitants) of being a capital or central munic­
ipality. We bring a series of rigorously tested results to what remains an on-going and high­
ly ideological debate in Spain regarding the financing of local governments, and especially 
the governments of large municipalities. While it is indisputable that these municipalities 
face higher costs given their particular nature, it is equally true that they also obtain addi­
tional economic benefits that need to be evaluated with these costs to obtain a complete pic­
ture of the public finances of these governments, especially if these questions are to be taken 
into account in possible reforms of the local financing system. 
Our results indicate that there are indeed significant costs factors associated with the 
central/capital nature of a municipality that influence the local per capita expenditure of 
these municipalities. These factors are essentially related to the existence of spillover effects 
(central costs) in central cities, measured by the number of tourists and the weight of the 
service sector, and the existence of capital costs associated with the amount of employment 
in other levels of government and the salaries paid in the local public sector. Our results also 
show that the socioeconomic structure can influence expenditure needs (primarily, the share 
of the population under 16 and over 65). Interestingly, we also find that the variables captur­
ing the central status of municipalities result in an increase in their fiscal capacity, but the 
variables capturing their status as a capital do not seem to be determinants of this fiscal ca­
pacity. 
Thus, the main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the centrality characteris­
tics of large municipalities in Spain increase their expenditure needs; yet, they have a posi­
tive impact on their fiscal capacity. As such, centrality implies certain additional costs, but 
it also brings some benefits. By contrast, the capital status of a municipality seems to gener­
ate mainly costs; that is, being a capital increases expenditure needs. Consequently, the local 
financing system for the large municipalities in Spain needs to give greater consideration to 
factors linked to capital characteristics, since the factors associated with the centrality char­
acteristics of municipalities appear to be offset by their greater fiscal capacity and, hence, do 
not, in principle, need to be explicitly recognised by the financing system. 
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Appendix: Calculation for the index of fiscal capacity
 
Figure A.1. Property tax (vertical axis) and last year of cadastral revision (horizontal axis) 
Kernel density estimate 
Figure A.2. Distribution of municipalities depending on the last year of cadastral revision 
Kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.6463 
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Table A.1.
 
CORRECTION OF THE TAX BASE OF THE PROPERTY TAX
 
Variables Property tax rate 
Discontinuity 0.2643 
(0.002)*** 
Time –0.0474 
(0.008)*** 
(Time)^2 0.002 
(0.016)** 
Constant 0.7121 
(0.000)*** 
Observations 85 
R-squared 0.1565 
F(3,81) 5.01***
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p-values in brackets. Discontinuity = 1 
if year is previous to 2001. 
Notes 
1.	 The Spanish Law on Local Authorities draws a distinction between municipalities on the basis of population 
size; however, this distinction differs according to the specific area being regulated (organizational, compe­
tences or financing). Referring to competences Article 26 of this Law lists the minimum competences that can 
be required to all municipalities (compulsory competences). These are public lighting, cemeteries, waste col­
lection, street cleaning, the domestic supply of drinking water, drains and sewers, access roads to centres of 
population, paving of public roads and control of food and beverages. The same Law divides municipalities 
into population ranges, the highest of which is municipalities with a population over 50,000 inhabitants and, 
based on those ranges, municipalities are designated additional competences. These are the so-called delegat­
ed competences. Moreover, the municipalities can also provide other additional services if they decide to do 
it (discretional competences). As for financing, the same model is applied to all the municipalities, with some 
adjustments being made according to population size and delegated competences, affecting above all tax rates 
and unconditional transfers. Nevertheless, the assignment of delegated responsibilities is not properly covered 
by adequate concomitant resources. The municipalities do not receive specific resources for the additional/dis­
cretional competences provided to citizens. 
2.	 Throughout the paper we use, for our convenience, the term “capital cost” as a synonym of “costs of being a 
capital”. 
3.	 The Spanish legislation does not provide a single definition as to what constitutes a large municipality (or 
city), although being an institutional capital is recognised as a distinctive feature to be taken into account. We 
take as our definition of large municipalities those with a population over 75,000 inhabitants, that is, adopt­
ing the categorisation used in the State’s financing system. 
4.	 This argument remains valid as long as the urban land available is fixed and its occupation by the administra­
tion tends to drive other economic activities outside the municipal area. 
5.	 Similar studies that estimate expenditure needs are, for instance, Allers and Ishemoi (2011) for Tanzania; Ball et 
al. (2012) for health care spending needs of the UK; Bailey (2005) for England, King et al. (2004) for Scotland. 
6.	 The measure of expenditure used is the current expenditure per capita. Nevertheless, for reasons of the robust­
ness of the estimation the total expenditure per capita is also used. 
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7.	 The Representative Revenue System (RSS) might also be used when the revenues based on the benefit prin­
ciple are also included in the fiscal capacity index. However, we opted not to include these revenues (user fees 
and public prices) in our calculations given that they are endogenous to political decisions, at least, more so 
than the other sources of revenue used. 
8.	 The advantage of this formulation is that it avoids our having to calculate the standard tax rate. 
9.	 On average, in 2008, the municipal non-financial revenue for large municipalities comes basically from grants 
(36.9%) and local taxes (34.5%). Moreover, there are also fees, sales, and fines (17.2%), property income 
(6.6%) and tax shares on national taxes (4.8%). 
10.	 In this sense, uncorrected tax bases (those in the municipalities that have not updated their cadastral values) 
would present a lower capacity index because of a political decision, and one moreover that does not reflect 
the reality of the municipality, that is, its true potential fiscal capacity through, for example, its actual housing 
values. 
11.	 The effective tax burden on a municipality is obtained by combining both the nominal tax rate and the extent 
to which the tax base (cadastral value) resembles the market price of the cadastral unit. Thus, given a munici­
pality’s revenue target, and in the absence of the corresponding revaluation of cadastral value, we would expect 
a higher nominal rate in those municipalities with cadastral values that have not been revised for some time. 
12	 In the appendix, Figure A.1 shows graphically a negative relation between property tax rate and the last year 
of cadastral revision. Figure A.2 shows how the distribution of municipalities with regard to their last cadas­
tral revision is bimodal, with 2001 being the cut-off point of that distribution. Finally Table A.1, based on the 
foregoing information, shows that municipalities that last revised their cadastral values before 2001 have a 
property tax rate that is 0.26 points higher than those with cadastral values revised after 2001. 
13.	 The budgetary information for this municipality is not available. 
14.	 Ideally, to construct this variable we would have needed detailed (real) data on the flow of commuters between 
municipalities, obtained from traffic and public transport statistics, or from mobility surveys. Given the im­
possibility to get such data for all the municipalities in our database we have opted to use population as a fair­
ly credible proxy for “potencial” commuters and, hence, potential users of the (public) services offered in each 
considered municipality (see also Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2004). This geographical criterion was also con­
sidered in the Report on the big cities and the areas of urban influence, carried out by the Spanish Ministry of 
Public Administrations back in 2001; more precisely, the Ministry used a 35-km distance. Therefore, we have 
performed some robustness estimations defining the distance threshold to each municipality equal to 25-km 
and 35-km. The obtained results, not reported but available upon request, do not change the main idea regard­
ing this variable explained in the results section. 
15.	 Again, we make us of the Report on the big cities and the areas of urban influence, carried out by the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Administrations in 2001 to define what it is considered a central city. 
16.	 The rationale behind the variable w_cost comes from the fact that salaries paid to public servants in large mu­
nicipalities are, in general, higher than in smaller ones. In Spain each municipality has its own salary grid (es­
pecially affecting the so-called “specific complement”). Moreover, there are also some extra benefits (such as 
the productivity pay) for public servants that can widely differ across municipalities. The same is also true for 
politicians and public managers (not public servants but positions of truth) working for local governments. 
17.	 The number of workers in the local administration in each municipality is calculated as follows; first, the num­
ber of local administration workers as a percentage of all public workers is obtained from provincial data; sec­
ond, this percentage is then applied over the total number of public workers at the municipal level. 
18.	 In the estimations presented in section 5, we opt to introduce both variables (w_cost and employ_public) in 
some regressions in spite of their having a high correlation coefficient (0.8), since we consider each to capture 
different aspects of capital costs – one the possible salary differentials between cities, and the other the pres­
ence of other administrations in the municipality. 
19.	 As a robustness exercise we also use the ratio between the population under 19 years of age and the total popu­
lation of the municipality (pop_under_19). These results are fairly consistent with those presented in section 5. 
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20.	 Current transfers are general grants basically from the central government, which try to account for the mu­
nicipal differences in necessity, capacity and fiscal effort. The differences in needs are measured by the pop­
ulation weighted by increasing weights according to municipal size. However, these transfers are not granted 
to explicitly cover the enumerated extra costs of central and capital municipalities. 
21.	 In the estimates of the determinants of the fiscal capacity we do not include property tax revenues in the cal­
culation of own_taxes/pop. 
22.	 Given that the economic interpretation of the estimated coefficients for these variables is difficult in relation 
to fiscal capacity, we also construct the variable pop_20_64. This indicates the share of the population aged 
between 20 and 64, and so serves as a proxy of the municipality’s active population. 
23.	 Given the nature of the underlying data, the quantitative interpretation of the obtained elasticities must be cau­
tions, for instance, the use of complex indexes (such as the one used to approximate tourism) may complicate 
the interpretation of results at face value. 
24.	 This statistically significant result would seem to reflect the fact that municipalities in Spain are, by large, key 
providers of children’s services, including daycare, which while not obligatory competences are in great de­
mand from local residents. 
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Resumen 
En este artículo determinamos los costes y beneficios de ser una capital o un municipio central, donde 
los costes en que se incurrirá se entienden específicamente como resultado de los problemas que expe­
rimentan los grandes municipios ubicados en el centro de una aglomeración urbana (incluyendo los 
costes asociados a los problemas sociales, la inmigración, la movilidad y las deseconomías de escala) 
y los costes de capitalidad son el resultado de la presencia de las instituciones de los gobiernos auto­
nómicos y/o centrales en el municipio (pérdida de ingresos o aumento de los gastos debido a la susti­
tución de la actividad). Sin embargo, estas dos características también podrían ser beneficiosas para los 
municipios (como resultado de un aumento directo en sus ingresos o capacidad fiscal). Mediante la es­
timación de una ecuación de las necesidades de gasto y de la capacidad fiscal de los municipios espa­
ñoles de más de 75.000 habitantes, se constata que los costes de centralidad incurridos por los grandes 
municipios se ven compensados por su mayor capacidad fiscal, pero que lo mismo no es cierto para 
los municipios que son capitales administrativas o políticas. 
Palabras clave: financiación local, grandes municipios, costes y beneficios de centralidad y de capita­
lidad, necesidades de gasto, capacidad fiscal. 
Clasificación JEL: H72, H77, R51. 

